Constitutional Law--Legislative Investigations--the Speech or Debate Clause: Congressional Subpoenas Issued to Third Parties--No Right to Question Their Constitutionality on First Amendment Grounds by Castleman-Zia, Linda M.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Winter 1976 Article 15 
Winter 1976 
Constitutional Law--Legislative Investigations--the Speech or 
Debate Clause: Congressional Subpoenas Issued to Third 
Parties--No Right to Question Their Constitutionality on First 
Amendment Grounds 
Linda M. Castleman-Zia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Linda M. Castleman-Zia, Constitutional Law--Legislative Investigations--the Speech or Debate Clause: 
Congressional Subpoenas Issued to Third Parties--No Right to Question Their Constitutionality on First 
Amendment Grounds, 41 MO. L. REV. (1976) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS-THE SPEECH OR DEBATE
CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS ISSUED TO
THIRD PARTIES-NO RIGHT TO QUESTION THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALITY ON FIRST
AMENDMENT GROUNDS
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund'
In January 1970 the United States Senate passed a resolution au-
thorizing the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to make a study
of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950.2 Pursuant to its mandate the subcommittee began an
inquiry into various activities of the United States Servicemen's Fund
(U.S.S.F.) to determine whether it was potentially harmful to armed
service morale.3 The subcommittee issued a subpoena duces tecum to a
New York bank where the organization had an account, ordering the bank
to produce all records involving the account. The U.S.S.F. brought an ac-
tion to enjoin implementation of the subpoena. Because of an earlier
decision that jurisdiction and venue lies only in the District of Columbia
in actions against congressional committees, 4 suit was filed in Washing-
ton, D.C. As a result, the New York bank was not subject to proper
service. The only parties before the court were Chairman Eastland, Senate
members, and the Chief Counsel of the subcommittee.
The U.S.S.F. alleged that enforcement of the subpoena should be en-
joined because: (1) the authorizing resolution and subcommittee action
implementing it were not within a "legitimate legislative sphere" and
thus the legislators were not immune under the speech or debate clause
of the Constitution; 5 and (2) even if the immunity applied, answering the
subpoena duces tecum would constitute a violation of its first amend-
ment rights. The U.S.S.F. further claimed that issuing the subpoena to a
third party deprived it of the ability to refuse to answer. Such refusal
might have led the Congress to institute a contempt action,0 in which
the U.S.S.F. could have raised the first amendment issue.7
1. 95 S. Ct. 1813 (1975).
2. S. Rys. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 1974 (January 80, 1970).
3. The U.S.S.F. is a nonprofit membership corporation supported by con-
tributions. It established coffeehouses near domestic military installations and
aided in the publication of an underground paper which communicated its
philosophy to armed service personnel concerning United States involvement in
Southeast Asia.
4. Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970).
5. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, d. 1. The language in question states that "for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [members of Congress) shall not be
questioned in any other place."
6. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970), provides for punishment of any person who was
summoned as a witness to give testimony or to produce papers upon matters
under proper inquiry and wilfully makes default or refuses to answer questions
upon appearance.
7. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 854 U.S. 178 (1957).
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After a hearing on the merits, the district court denied the permanent
injunction. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court found
that issuance of the subpoena was within a "legitimate legislative sphere"
and hence the committee was absolutely immune from being questioned.
Because the privilege is absolute, first amendment rights play no part
in a case where a private citizen attempts to interfere with an ongoing
congressional activity.
The speech or debate clause of the Constitution provides legislators
and their aides with immunity from judicial review if their actions are
within a "legitimate legislative sphere." The purpose of the clause is to
provide legislators with immunity for any speech or debate in either
House and to protect legislators from being questioned in any other
place. The clause enables legislators to function independently, free from
"intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile judiciary,"8 and reinforces the separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution. However, it is not the purpose of the clause to protect all
conduct in which a legislator engages. Although the immunity is broad,
it is not unlimited.9 The term "legitimate legislative sphere" has been
adopted to define the limits of the immunity. In order for a congressman's
activities to be immune from judicial review, they must be within this
sphere. In Gravel v. United States'o the Supreme Court defined "legitimate
legislative sphere" as:
[That range of activity which is] an integral part of the delibera-
tive and communicative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect to . . . pro-
posed legislation or . . . other matters which the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either House."
In United States v. Brewster'2 the Court referred to the sphere as includ-
ing "acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process."' 3
Unusual or irregular acts would not be immune from judicial questioning.
Both congressional investigations' 4 and the issuance of subpoenas' 5 have
been found to be acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative
process.
8. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
9. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515 (1972); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
10. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
11. Id. at 625.
12. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
13. Id. at 525.
14. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539,
544-45 (1963); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v.
Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
15. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957); 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970);
see Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion, 40 HA1v. L. REv. 153, 159 (1926).
1976]
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Watkins v. United States16 further developed the "legitimate legisla-
tive sphere" concept. The Court stated that to be within the protection of
the speech or debate clause a congressional investigation "must be related
to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate legislative task."' 7 A legitimate
task is the enactment of valid legislation and appropriations in reference to
it. The subject must be one on which legislation or appropriations could
be made. It is only then that the investigation is an integral part of the
legislative process. A second requirement of Watkins is that the com-
mittee be instructed as to what it is to do with the power delegated to
it.1s These instructions can be transmitted through the authorizing resolu-
tion, the Chairman's statement, or the nature of the proceedings them-
selves. Through some means the committee's jurisdiction and purpose
must be spelled out so that their actions conform with the will of the
parent body. A third requiiement is that there exist a nexus between the
subject matter of inquiry and the individual under investigation-i.e.,
a demonstrable relationship between the individual's activities and the
legitimate legislative task.19 If these requirements are met, congressional
activities are within the "legitimate legislative sphere." The ensuing im-
munity under the speech or debate clause extends to legislative aides and
employees. However, they are immune only insofar as their conduct would
.be protected if performed by the legislator himself.20
The Court in Eastland devoted considerable time to the conclusive
finding that an investigation and issuance of a subpoena are "an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative process . .. ."z In con-
trast, the Court gave only 'cursory treatment to the requirements set
down for congressional investigations in Watkins. In two paragraphs the
Court determined that all requirements were met. The majority opinion
states that the inquiry was related to a legitimate task because the sub.
ject was a proper one for legislation,2 2 the authorizing resolution was
unambiguous,2 3 and there was a prima facie case showing the need for
investigation of the U.S.S.F.2 4 Irrespective of the wisdom of such brevity,
the Court was probably correct in finding that the requirements of
Watkins were met.
The U.S.S.F. alleged that the production of its bank accounts, includ-
ing the names of contributors, was unconstitutional because such' pro-
16. 854 U.S. 178 (1957).
17. Id. at 187; accord, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12
(1959).
18. 354 U.S. at 209.
19. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546(1963); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 352,
488 F.2d 1252, 1283 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
20. Gravel v4 United States,.408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
21. 95 S. Ct. at 1821-22.
22. Id. at 1822-23. , -
23. Id. at 1828.
24. Id.
[Vol. 41
3
Castleman-Zia: Castleman-Zia: Constitutional Law--Legislative Investigations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
RECENT CASES'
duction would force public disclosure of beliefs and associations of private
citizens and deter them in their exercise of first amendment rights.25 It
asked the Court to protect these rights by adopting some exception to
the immunity of legislators and their aides acting within a "legitimate
legislative sphere."
In the past, three exceptions to the broad immunity given Congress by"
the speech or debate clause have been discussed or applied by the
Court. The first applies when the "aggrieved" party is a defendant in
a criminal contempt proceeding.26 In such cases an -individual's con-
stitutional rights may be asserted as a defense.2 7 The Court justified this
"exception" on the grounds that an 'interference with congressional action
has already occurred when the case reaches the judiciary.' In addition,
in a contempt proceeding Congress is seeking the aid of the courts to
enforce its actions;28 thus, Congress has waived its immunity. This ex-
ception did not extend to Eastland where the U.S.S.F. sought the aid of
the fedeial courts.29
In Gravel v. United States3 o and Powell v. McCormack31 the Court
discussed a second theory limiting the immunity of the speech or debate
clause. Under this theory, whereas legislators issuing an unconstitutional
order are immune from judicial interference, those parties 'executing that
order may be subject to the power of the courts if their acts are "non-
essential" to legislating. If the decision is illegal, and the act "non-essen-
tial," the aggrieved individual may seek redress from the employee or aide
who executed the decision. Acts which have been determined "non-es-
sential"' to legislating include the private publication of papers,3 2 the
barring *of a legislator from the floor of Congress,83 'and the imprisonment
of one who refused to honor a congressional inquiry.34 This the key term
is "non-essential," but no clear definition of the phrase carn be found in
Gravel or in other cases discussing this exception. In all of these situa-
tions, however, a planned or completed legislative act was to some extent
frustrated. Thus it seems safe to conclude that an act may have a sub-
25. An organization is allowed to sue in behalf of its members so that their
rights may be protected. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958).
26. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); "Flaxner v. United
States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
27.. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
28. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 216 (1957).
29. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1824-25
n.16 (1975).
30. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
31. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
32. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
33. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
34. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Judicial proceedings were
not involved in this case. Here the House' itself ordered and caused the imprison-
ment of Kilbourn. By allowing an action to lie against the sergeant at arms, the
Court had determined the execution of an act involved in 'enforcing a congres-
sional subpoena to be "non-essential."
19761
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stantial effect upon the underlying purpose of the order and yet be deemed
"'non-essential."3 5 '
The majority of the Court in Eastland discussed the idea of allowing
an action to lie against those individuals who executed the subpoena, but
rejected it. The Court declared summarily that although some acts of em-
ployees are not "essential to legislating," "quite the contrary is the case
with a routine subpoena intended to gather information. ... 36 Unfor-
tunately, the Court did not find it necessary to define the term "non-
essential" nor distinguish other cases which allowed an action against
those executing. congressional decisions. The concurring opinion would
have applied the Gravel exception if the individual who executed the sub-
poena had been before the Court.37
A third theory, suggested in Kilbourn v. Thompson3s and the court
of appeals' decision in Eastland,8 9 is that in "extraordinary situations"
direct action may be allowed against the legislators. Although Kilbourn
first suggested this exception, it offered little description as to what con-
stitutes such a situation. It briefly referred to legislative actions with
criminal purposes.
The court of appeals' opinion in Eastland expanded this concept to
include "unique circumstances . . .which . . . demonstrate that such
Member's presence in the litigation is unavoidable if a valid order is to
be entered by the court to vindicate rights which would otherwise go un-
redressed." 40 Eastland presented such circumstances. The U.S.S.F. could
not force the subcommittee affirmatively to use the courts. In addition,
the only parties before the Court were those who caused the subpoena
to be issued, whose actions were within a "legitimate legislative sphere,"
and were immune. Therefore, absent direct action against the legislators,
the U.S.S.F. had no remedy.
The Supreme Court rejected the concept that direct action could be
allowed in extraordinary situations.41 The Court accepted the absolute
nature of the immunity conferred by the speech or debate clause. Realiz-
ing the potential for abuse by unconstitutional acts within a "legitimate
legislative sphere," the Court bowed to "the conscious choice of the Fram-
ers [of the Constitution] buttressed and justified by history."42
The Court thus found no applicable limitation of congressional im-
munity. The Court deemed it of the utmost importance that legislative
proceedings not be delayed by judicial questioning. The subcommittee's
inquiry in this case was frustrated for five years by the actions of the
85. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 (1972).
86. 95 S. Ct. at 1824.
37. Id. at 1828.
38. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
89. United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (1978).
40. Id. at 1270
41. 95 S.Ct. at 1828.
42. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).
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U.S.S.F. The Court reacted against that delay.43 The decision shuts the
door completely to individuals who allege that their constitutional rights
were violated by an affirmative action of Congress. No leeway is given to
accommodate a case where the legislative interest is insignificant, whereas
the individual's interest is great. The Court will, however, continue to
declare congressional activities unconstitutional and provide remedies
when an individual asserts constitutional rights in a criminal contempt
proceeding. 44
In light of the Court's determination that judicial review of legisla-
tors' activities is limited in this context to finding that the actvities are
or are not within a "legitimate legislative sphere,"45 a more probing look
into the satisfaction of Watkins' requirements' seems fitting. The cursory
examination undertaken by the Court in Eastland belittles the impact
that judicial review can and should have on congressional investigations
through a determination that the activities are within a "legitimate legis-
lative sphere."46 Ideally, the legislature should realize that its actions
are examined extensively to insure compliance with the Constitution.
If the purpose of the speech or debate clause is to insure the in-
tegrity of the legislative branch by preventing intimidation by other
branches and to free the legislative process from delays initiated by
citizens, the majority opinion best accomplished it. The Gravel exception,
by disallowing the execution of legislative decisions, plays as much havoc
with the integrity of the legislature as direct judicial invalidaton of con-
gressional action. However, previous cases have accepted such interference
in order to protect an individual's constitutional rights.4T If the purpose
of the clause is to "assure the independence of the legislators and their
freedom from vexatious and distracting litigation," 48 the court of appeals'
decision also accomplished that purpose by providing some protection to
both the citizens and the legislators.
The anomalous result of the Supreme Court's decision in Eastland is
that whether an individual can protect his constitutional rights when
threatened by a congressional subpoena within a "legitimate legislative
sphere" depends upon such factors as: whether the subpoena is directed
to the individual or his bank; whether the individual's bank can be served
43. 95 S. Ct. at 1825.
44. Id. at 1824 n.16.
45. Id. at 1820, 1827.
46. For an extensive examination, see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
42-46 (1953) (the "legitimate legislative sphere"); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 201-06 (1957) (dear understanding of purpose and jurisdiction); United
States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1271-74 (1973) (dissenting
opinion) (the nexus between inquiry and individual).
47. Power v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); For an excellent
discussion, see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Reinstein and Silver-
glate, Legislative Privilege and the Separtion of Powers, 86 HARV. L. Rxv. 1113
(1973); Note, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 780 (1973).
48. 95 S. Ct. at 1828.
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